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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAHr 
Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 910494 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This interlocutory appeal is from a Memorandum Decision 
and Order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. This 
court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I 
All evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry 
must be suppressed. The unauthorized no-knock entry violated Utah 
Code Ann. §77-23-10. The officers who executed the search warrant 
failed to give notice of authority before entry into Thurman's 
apartment. The warrant did not authorize a no-knock entry. 
POINT II 
The officers did not lawfully obtain defendant's consent 
to search following the initial police conduct. Defendant's 
consent was not voluntary. The consent to search was obtained by 
exploitation of prior illegal police conduct and all evidence 
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resulting from it must be suppressed. The standard of review for 
a trial court's finding of consent is that a finding shall not be 
set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), citing Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
POINT III 
The warrant is not supported by probable cause due to the 
staleness of information in the warrant application. All infor-
mation regarding Thurman's motive and opportunity are events 
occurring several months prior to the criminal incident. The 
standard of review is one of great deference to the magistrate's 
decision. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant is charged with one capital homicide and two 
related felonies in the death of Adam Cook. Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress all evidence found in a search of his apartment 
and storage unit. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
on August 28, 1991. The Honorable Michael R. Murphy denied the 
motion on October 9, 1991. This court granted defendant's petition 
to file an interlocutory appeal on November 5, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 15, 1991, at 9:35 p.m. a bomb exploded in his 
father's car and fatally wounded Adam Cook (Evidentiary Hearing 
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Transcript, 8-28-91, p. 28). On May 16, 1991, at 11:17 p.m., U.S. 
Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a search warrant for Thurman's 
apartment and a 1975 Chevrolet Monza (T. 28). Despite a request 
in the warrant application, Judge Boyce did not grant a nighttime 
search or no-knock entry (T. 15-16, 29). The affidavit of Roderic 
J. Conner, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), was the basis for probable cause for 
the warrant (Addendum 2). 
The warrant affidavit included five basic allegations. 
First, Howard Cook, the victim's father, alleged that Thurman 
wanted to harm him because he was having an affair with Thurman's 
former wife, Wendy Thurman (Addendum 2, p. 3). He also alleged 
that Thurman drove an early 1980's light colored Monza (Addendum 
2, p. 3). Second, Wendy Thurman, defendant's former wife, stated 
that Thurman would not talk to her after their divorce several 
months earlier but had not made any threats against her (Addendum 
2, p. 3). She also stated that Thurman had waited outside her 
apartment and watched her return from a date with Howard Cook 
several months earlier (Addendum 2, p. 3). Third, Linda Mae Bird, 
Wendy Thurman's aunt, stated that Thurman called her six months 
earlier and told her he had hired a private investigator to watch 
Howard and Wendy (Addendum 2, p. 4). She alleged that Thurman was 
"extremely angry" at Wendy because of the divorce and that he hates 
Wendy for it (Addendum 2, p. 4). Fourth, Diane Burbidge, a 
resident in the blast vicinity, saw a small two-door vehicle with 
no lights speeding from the area (Addendum 2, p. 4). Fifth, on May 
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14, 1991, Howard Cook's and Wendy Thurman1s employer received a 
call from a male who said that a bomb was in the back of one of the 
trucks. After a search, Salt Lake County deputies found no bomb 
(Addendum 2, p. 2). 
On May 17, 1991, six law enforcement officers from ATF 
and Murray City Police forced open Thurman5s apartment door with 
a ramming device at 6:14 a.m. (T. 32). The officers did not 
announce their identity or give Thurman an opportunity to respond 
before they rammed the door (T. 52-53, 71). At the time of entry, 
Thurman was sleeping in his bedroom (T. 72, 80). The officers 
immediately handcuffed Thurman (T. 32). While being handcuffed, 
Thurman did not resist, but he did hit his nose on the bed and it 
began bleeding (T. 81). ATF Special Agent Swehla informed Thurman 
of his Miranda rights and placed the search warrant in his lap (T. 
54). 
At the time of the officers' entry, Thurman was naked and 
was not allowed to dress for one hour (T. 54, 72, 84). During that 
time, Thurman was handcuffed in front (T. 54). At 7:30 a.m. 
Thurman signed two consents to search a cab-over camper, a 1975 
Chevrolet Monza and a 1973 Toyota Landcruiser (T. 58, 62). Between 
7:30 and 7:45 a.m., ATF Special Agent Taylor asked Thurman about 
a pay envelope found in the kitchen (T. 83). Thurman answered that 
it was a pay envelope for his storage unit (T. 82). Thurman kept 
this envelope in his kitchen in a bill and key holder (T. 82). The 
officers did not know about the storage unit before 7:30 a.m. (T. 
86). 
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At 7:40 a.m. an officer asked Thurman to sign a consent 
to search his storage unit (T. 63-64). When Thurman hesitated, 
Special Agent Taylor stated, "We are going to get these anyway," 
(T. 83). Thurman signed the consent at that time (T. 83). During 
this time, Thurman remained handcuffed in front (T. 17). At least 
six agents were searching Thurman1s small 650-square-foot apartment 
(T. 72). 
At 11 a.m. an officer removed Thurman1s handcuffs, and 
Thurman accompanied the officers to his storage unit (T. 18). Upon 
arrival, Thurman opened the combination lock to the unit (T. 18). 
After the agents opened the door, Thurman signed a second consent 
to search the storage unit at 11:29 a.m. (T. 18). 
Immediately thereafter, Thurman accompanied the agents 
to his apartment to retrieve keys to a truck inside the storage 
unit (T. 22). Thurman was handcuffed at that time (T. 22). They 
returned to the storage unit and the officers searched the unit (T. 
23). During this search, Agent Swehla escorted Thurman to the 
police mobile command unit and interrogated him (T. 66). 
Thurman was arrested at 2:30 p.m. (T. 38). Except for 
a short period of time, Thurman was handcuffed from 6:17 a.m. to 
2:30 p.m. (T. 38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The officers executed a no-knock entry in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10(2). The magistrate did not direct a 
no-knock warrant. No exigent circumstances required a no-knock 
entry. No-knock statutes are grounded in the Fourth Amendment. 
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The officers1 entry violated defendant's substantive Fourth 
Amendment rights. Therefore, the court must suppress all evidence 
from the search. 
2. To be admissible, the consent must be voluntary and 
must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. Because defendant was subject to a forced entry, was 
handcuffed for six hours and subject to subtle police action, 
defendant's consent is not voluntary. The officers obtained the 
consent after discovering the existence of the storage unit in the 
search after the unlawful conduct. Therefore, the consent is 
inadmissible. 
3. The warrant application was based on stale 
information which undermines the probable cause for the warrant. 
The stale information concerns the defendant's actions several 
months prior to the warrant. The alleged facts in the affidavit 
are not sufficiently related in time to the issue of the warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
OFFICERS' ILLEGAL ENTRY MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
A. THE OFFICERS' ENTRY VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANN. §77-23-10. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10(2) (1953, as amended), allows 
an officer executing a search warrant to enter without notice of 
his authority and purpose only if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs so in the warrant. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 - Force used in executing warrant - Notice 
of authority prerequisite, when. 
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When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may use such 
force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
* * * 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant 
directs in the warrant that the officer need 
not give notice, the magistrate shall so direct 
only upon proof under oath, that the object of 
the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
of, or secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were given. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), this court 
held that Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 contemplated that absent no-
knock authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should knock 
and announce his authority. Knock and announce requirements 
protect three basic interests: (1) an individual's private 
activities in his home; (2) both police and occupants from any 
violence or injury resulting from unannounced police entry; and (3) 
property from any damage resulting from the forced entry (I_d. at 
701). 
Here, the agents requested no-knock authorization in the 
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10. Judge Boyce did not 
authorize a "no-knock" entry and additionally restricted the search 
to day time hours. Yet, the officers executed a no-knock entry. 
Agent Swehla, the entry team leader, admitted that a ramming device 
was used on Thurman's door (T. 52-53). He also admitted that the 
entry and the announcement were made simultaneously (T. 53). The 
trial court found that the officers executed the warrant as a no-
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knock warrant even though Judge Boyce did not authorize a forced 
entry. 
Absent no-knock warrant authority, the State must show 
that exigent circumstances existed which necessitated the officers1 
no-knock entry, State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. Not only did the 
warrant not direct a no-knock entry, no exigent circumstances 
existed to require such an entry. Thurman was not considered 
dangerous and, unlike narcotic cases, no likelihood existed that 
the evidence could be quickly destroyed. Neither the State nor the 
participating officers, in their testimonies, contend that evidence 
could quickly be destroyed if notice had been given. 
Therefore, the officers had no legal authority, not by 
warrant or circumstances, to execute a no-knock entry. Such an 
entry is unlawful. 
B. VIOLATION OF NO-KNOCK STATUTE RESULTS IN SUPPRESSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Since the officers1 no-knock entry violated knock and 
announce rules, the most appropriate remedy is the suppression of 
the evidence, United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
In State v. Buck, supra, this court refused to suppress 
the evidence obtained in an unauthorized no-knock entry and search. 
That case did not justify suppression because the no-knock occurred 
when no one was present who could respond to the officers1 demand. 
The court also reasoned that it did not violate Thurman1s Fourth 
Amendment rights since he was not home and the manner of entry had 
no effect on the extent of the individual's invasion of privacy, 
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State v. Buck, at 703. However, unlike Buck, Thurman was home at 
the time of the entry. 
In State v. Rowe, 806 P. 2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), the 
court stated that a violation of a statute which establishes 
procedure to protect substantive rights cannot be dismissed as 
technical or minuscule and suppression of the evidence gained from 
the challenged searched is the appropriate remedy. 
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this 
issue in particular, some jurisdictions, including the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that no-knock statutes are 
clearly grounded in the Fourth Amendment protections of the 
sanctity of the home. See, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381 
(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824 (9th 
Cir. 1979); cert, denied 441 U.S. 965, S.Ct. 2415,60 L.Ed.2d 1071 
(1079); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 (Idaho 1978); People v. 
Gifford, 782 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1989); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263, 
127 Cal.Rptr. 699, 545 P.2d 1333 (1976). 
Other courts have not gone as far as a Fourth Amendment 
claim but do state that a knock and announce violation is serious 
enough that all evidence seized during the search must be 
suppressed, United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 
amended on other grounds, 1985); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671 
(Idaho 1978); Greven v. Super. Ct. of County of Santa Clara, 71 
Cal.2d 287, 78 Cal.Rptr. 504, 455 P.2d 432 (1969). 
It is clear in the 10th Circuit that knock and announce 
rules encompass substantive rights that rise to a constitutional 
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level. Utah Code Ann. §77-10-3 was enacted to protect those 
rights. According to Rowe, violation of those rights must be 
remedied by suppression. 
The trial court agreed that the officers' no-knock entry 
was unlawful and that any evidence found in the apartment must be 
suppressed. However, the court went on to say that no relevant 
evidence was obtained in the apartment and therefore no evidence 
exists to suppress. The court overlooked that the pay envelope to 
Thurman's storage unit was found. Without knowledge of that 
storage unit, the officers would not have searched the unit, a 
search that resulted in some physical evidence. 
Therefore, all evidence found as a result of the original 
discovery of the pay envelope must be suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS NOT LAWFULLY OBTAINED 
FOLLOWING THE INITIAL POLICE CONDUCT. 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 784 (Utah 1990), sets out two 
factors that determine whether the consent was lawfully obtained 
following initial police misconduct. The consent must be voluntary 
and it must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality. 
h. THURMAN'S CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. 
An involuntary consent is invalid, State v. Valdez, 748 
P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987). The State has the burden of to prove that 
the consent was voluntary, State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
App. 1990). The court must "indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there 
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must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived/' Id. 
The trial court concluded that the State had met that burden by 
showing clear and convincing evidence that both consents to search 
the storage unit were knowingly and voluntarily granted. 
However, Thurman's circumstance included many factors the 
courts recognize as indicating voluntariness or the lack thereof. 
The court must not only examine police conduct, but also it must 
examine the characteristics of the accused, State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990). 
The initial events of the morning of the search could 
only have left Thurman in a vulnerable subjective state, Robinson, 
797 P.2d at 437. Thurman was awakened at 6:14 a.m. by six law 
enforcement officers breaking down his door with guns drawn and 
yelling simultaneously. The officers raced into Thurman's bedroom 
grabbed him by the back of the hair and banged his nose against the 
bed in an attempt to "secure" him. He was handcuffed when Agent 
Swehla handed him a search warrant and informed him of his rights, 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (officers 
exhibited force). Any individual would be confused and disoriented 
if awakened in such a manner, State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 
(Utah App. 1990) (vulnerable subjective state of mind of consenting 
individual). 
During this period of time, Thurman was naked for up to 
one hour. At least six officers were searching the 650-square-
foot apartment. Except for a short period of time, Thurman 
remained handcuffed until the time of his arrest at 2:30 p.m. 
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Because Thurman was handcuffed for such a long time, the detention 
included some indicia of arrest/ another relevant factorf State v. 
Kelly/ 718 P.2d 385/ 391 (Utah 1986) (indicia of arrest includes 
handcuffs, forced entry with guns drawn and lengthy interrogation); 
State v, Webb/ 790 P.2d 65/ 83 (Utah App. 1990). 
When he signed the first consent/ Thurman had been 
handcuffed for at least one hour. When he signed the second 
consent/ he had been handcuffed for five hours, Thurman also 
testified that when he hesitated to sign the first consent/ Special 
Agent Taylor said/ "We are going to get these anyway." Agent 
Swehla testified that he did not hear or see anyone make that 
remark. The trial court found that the remark was made but that 
Agent Swehla did not make it. 
Agent Taylorfs indication that issuance of the warrant 
was inevitable vitiates consent if the probable cause required for 
such a warrant was anything less than ironclad/ State v. BobO/ 803 
P.2d 1268/ 1274 (Utah App. 1990) n. 7. At that time in the search/ 
the officers had found no evidence of criminal conduct. Since 
probable cause for the original warrant was weak/ if not non-
existent (see discussion, infraf Point III)/ probable cause for 
further search would also be suspect. Agent Taylor's claim of 
authority to search is a factor listed in State v. Whittenback/ 621 
P.2d 103/ 106 (Utah 1980). 
Thurman testified that when he signed the first consent/ 
he felt shaken up and intimidated. Even Agent conner testified 
that the agents maintained control of the scene. 
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The totality of all these factors adds up to a subtly 
coercive situation in which Thurman's consent was involuntary. 
Because the consent was involuntary, all evidence obtained as a 
result of the consent must be suppressed, 
B. THE CONSENT, VOLUNTARY OR NOT, WAS OBTAINED BY POLICE 
EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
Illegal police conduct cannot be cleansed by merely 
obtaining consent after the illegality occurs, State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 784 (Utah 1990). The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine can 
invalidate otherwise voluntary consents, J[d. at 690, citing Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963). Wong Sun held that the trial court must determine whether 
the evidence has been obtained by exploitation of the illegality 
or by other means which are sufficiently distinguishable to purge 
the primary taint, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
Here, the trial court held that "the circumstances and 
passage of time from the entry to the first consent and the entry 
to the second consent purged each of the consents from the taint 
of the unauthorized no-knock entry." The court continued that the 
officers did nothing to relate back to the entry and did not use 
any further unnecessary show of force not otherwise implicit by 
their presence. The passage of time proved to be the best 
antiseptic, cleansing the second consent from any taint of the 
illegal entry. 
However, the amount of time does not cleanse the taint 
and the situation becomes more coercive as time passes. During the 
time between entry and the consents, Thurman was not free to move 
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about but was handcuffed and under the control of the officers. 
As time progressed, Thurman was subject to continuing police 
interrogation, pressure to cooperate in the search of the units and 
subject to the influence of several officers. In that time Thurman 
was told the search would occur regardless of his consent and he 
witnessed several strangers with significant authority search 
through his most personal possessions. During those six hours, 
Thurman was continually restrained and continually detained, 
Because of the nature of his detainment, no amount of time can 
cleanse the illegal taint. 
POINT III 
STALE INFORMATION IN THE WARRANT APPLICATION 
UNDERMINES THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANT. 
Search warrant affidavits must be construed in a common 
sense reasonable manner, State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 
1987). An affidavit supporting a warrant must contain "specific 
facts sufficient to support a determination by an impartial 
magistrate that probable cause exists," State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 
987, 990 (Utah 1989). Probable cause requires a determination that 
a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in the area covered by the search warrant, State v. 
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case an affidavit supported the search warrant. 
It alleged that Thurman hated the victim's father Howard Cook 
because he was having an extramarital affair with Wendy Thurman, 
his former wife, before they were divorced. It was also based on 
statements made by Linda Mae Bird, Wendy Thurman1s aunt, and Wendy 
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Thurman. Both alleged events regarding Thurman occurred several 
months prior to the bombing. A neighbor in the bomb area alleged 
she saw a small two-door vehicle speed from the area with no 
lights. On May 14, 1991, a male called Howard Cook's employer to 
say that a bomb was in one of the trucks, but Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's deputies found no bomb. 
None of these allegations point to Thurman. Most of the 
events involving Thurman occurred several months earlier. 
Construed as a whole, these allegations are not specific facts 
sufficient to allege probable cause. In fact, the passage of time 
alone affects the probable cause. 
Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated 
violation, it would be unreasonable to imply 
that probably cause dwindles rather quickly 
with the passage of time. 
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), quoting 
United States v. Johnsen, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(emphasis added). 
The trial court held that even though much of the 
information in the supporting affidavit occurred months before, 
these allegations were proposed to suggest that Thurman had motive 
and opportunity to commit the crime. The court explained that most 
of the cases addressing the question of staleness approach it from 
the perspective of whether there is a sufficient showing that the 
evidence can still be located at the site to be searched. 
In Srgo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a reissued search warrant based upon a previous expired 
warrant was unlawful. The court reasoned: 
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While the statute does not fix the time within 
which proof of probable cause must be taken by 
the judge or commission, it is manifest that 
the proof must be of facts so closely related 
to the time of issue of the warrant as to 
justify a finding of probable cause at that 
time. 
Srgo v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed.2d 260 
(1932). 
In this case, the alleged facts in the affidavit occur 
some months prior to the warrant. The affidavit does not allege 
that Thurman's actions and attitudes were the same at the time of 
bombing as they were in the alleged attitudes in the affidavit. 
Little distinction exists between whether the evidence is still at 
the location or if it was ever at the location. Both kinds of 
facts must still be sufficiently related in time in order for them 
to provide a basis for probable cause. 
CONCLUSION 
The officers illegally executed a no-knock entry. 
Because the entry violated Thurman's substantive Fourth Amendment 
rights to freedom from unreasonable searches, all evidence obtained 
in the search must be suppressed. The most notable piece of 
evidence obtained from the search is a pay envelope to Thurman's 
storage unit. Based upon this pay envelope, the officers obtained 
consent, albeit an involuntary one, to search the storage unit. 
This consent was tainted by the unlawful entry. No intervening 
events cleanse that taint. Most of the State's physical evidence 
was obtained in the storage unit search pursuant to Thurman's 
alleged consent. All of the evidence and the consents were 
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obtained as a result of the pay envelope.
 X-T.he pay envelope is 
inadmissible due to the officers' unlawful no-knock entry. 
Therefore, all evidence from the search/is inadmissible. 
/ 
Respectfully submitted this 1/ 7 day of November, 1991. 
» 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 911900907 
Defendant Steven Douglas Thurman has moved to suppress 
evidence resulting from searches conducted under a warrant and 
written consents. Additionally, he seeks to suppress 
statements he made during the searches. Many of the pertinent 
facts are uncontested but some are necessarily part of the fact 
finding duties of the court. This Memorandum Decision 
constitutes the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
I. FACTS 
The defendant is charged with a capital homicide and two 
related felonies. The Information alleges that defendant 
caused the death of Adam Cook by means of a bomb which was 
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detonated on the night of May 15, 1991. On the night following 
the bombing incident, U.S. Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a 
warrant to search defendant's apartment. The application for 
the search warrant requested authorization to enter defendant's 
apartment without giving notice (nno-knockn entry) and at any 
time of the day or night. The warrant issued, however, 
restricted the search to the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 
p.m. and did not authorize a f,no-knockn entry. 
The basis for the warrant was the affidavit of Roderic J. 
Conner, a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms ("ATF"). All the information contained in the 
affidavit appears to have been developed in the days and hours 
following the May 15 bombing. 
Assuming the accuracy of the Conner affidavit and the 
hearsay statements therein, the following facts supporting the 
issuance of a warrant were submitted to Magistrate Boyce: A 
bomb was placed in an automobile belonging to Howard Cook and 
was detonated on May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam. 
Mr. Cook had been having an affair with defendant's former 
wife, Wendy Thurman. The affair spanned the period before and 
after the Thurman divorce but was not the cause of the 
divorce. As recent as May 13, Cook had spent the night at 
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Wendy Thurman's residence. The defendant was aware of the 
affair between Mr. Cook and his former wife. The defendant 
reported this affair to Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if 
she intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to reside in the 
Cook house. While defendant had made no threats directly to 
his former wife, on at least one occasion several months before 
the bombing incident he sat in his car in the early morning 
hours outside his former wife's apartment and observed his 
former wife and Mr. Cook returning from a date. Defendant had 
expressed his anger toward and hatred for his former wife and 
indicated he had hired a private investigator to watch her and 
Mr. Cook. On the morning of May 14, a male caller to Metz 
Bakery, an establishment where both Mr. Cook and defendant's 
former wife were employed, stated that there was a bomb in one 
of the trucks. The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
investigated but found no bomb. On the day of the bombing, May 
15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in the Metz Bakery parking 
lot from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. At the time of the bombing, 
Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in front of the Richard Craig 
residence located at 5740 South 665 West in Murray. A neighbor 
of the Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle leave the area 
at a high rate of speed and with its lights out. The Affidavit 
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does not, however, specify the date or time when the neighbor 
made this observation. The defendant drives a Chevrolet 
Monza. (Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4, 6-10, 12). 
At 6:14 a.m. on May 17, 1991, the day following the 
issuance of the warrant and two days following the bombing, 
seven law enforcement officers executed the warrant. Six of 
the officers forced their way into defendant's apartment with 
weapons drawn less than 3 0 seconds after knocking. The ATF 
agent in charge of entry testified that the officers announced 
their identity and intent simultaneously with their entry. 
Defendant was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no resistance 
when he was subdued and handcuffed by the officers. In the 
process, defendant was cut on the nose and attended to by 
paramedics on the scene. The evidence does not indicate 
whether the paramedics were summoned out of concern for the 
officers7 liability or the defendant's well-being. The 
paramedics treated defendant and he was allowed to dress at 
some time before 7:30 a.m. and perhaps as early as 6:30. 
Defendant was initially informed of his rights in accordance 
with the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
soon after the officers' entry but before he was treated by the 
paramedics and allowed to dress. 
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At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two forms granting consent to 
search two automobiles and a camper. ATF Agent Robert Swehla 
read the consent form verbatim to defendant. As the search at 
defendant's apartment proceeded, the officers became aware of a 
storage unit which defendant rented. At 7:40 a.m. defendant 
signed another consent form authorizing a generalized search of 
the storage unit. Defendant fully understood the three 
consents before signing. His own testimony indicated that he 
was not compelled or coerced to sign. There is a conflict in 
the evidence whether an officer suggested that defendant's 
failure to cooperate and sign the consent would not ultimately 
prohibit a search. The court specifically finds that an 
officer made that suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla. 
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of acquiring these 
consents. It should be noted that the consents were signed 
75-85 minutes following entry and after defendant dressed, 
called his employer, was treated by the paramedics and informed 
of his constitutional right to counsel and right to remain 
silent. 
Between approximately 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., an officer again 
informed defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision. 
At 11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers to the storage 
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unit and the defendant again signed a general consent to search 
the storage unit at 11:29 a.m. ATF Agent Conner went over the 
consent form with defendant point by point before he signed the 
form. Defendant understood the consent and testified himself 
that his signature was not coerced. He also understood that 
the form was similar to that which he previously signed for 
Agent Swehla. 
While the search of the storage unit proceeded at about 
12:30 or 1:00 p.m., ATF Agent Swehla invited defendant into a 
mobile command unit to talk. It was at this time defendant 
made the statements which he now seeks to suppress. Defendant 
was not given any further warnings of his right to remain 
silent or right to counsel. Immediately after making the 
subject statements, defendant did invoke his right to counsel. 
The questioning then ceased. 
Defendant was handcuffed throughout the various searches 
with the exception of a total of 20 minutes to one hour at the 
storage unit and in transit. Defendant was not formally 
arrested until 2:30 p.m. There can be no doubt, however, that 
defendant was in custody since 6:14 a.m. 
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II. SEARCH WARRANT 
This court's obligation in reviewing the search warrant is 
merely to insure the Magistrate had an appropriate basis for 
determining that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 
warrant. In conducting this review, the court should render 
great deference to the Magistrate's determination. The 
Magistrate's decision is not a theoretical or technical one but 
instead a practical, common sense determination considering the 
totality of the circumstances specified in the affidavit. It 
is the Magistrate's obligation to determine whether there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found at the specified location. State v. Hansen, 732 P. 2d 
127, 129 (Utah 1987); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 
(Utah App. 1987); State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
In reviewing the affidavit presented to Magistrate Boyce, 
it can be fairly inferred that the defendant had a motivation 
to harm Mr. Cook and had demonstrated an intense interest in 
knowing Mr. Cook's comings and goings. Mr. Cook's employer had 
been the subject of a bomb threat just one day before the 
bombing in question. This information was sufficient to 
justify the Magistrate's determination that there was a fair 
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probability evidence of the crime could be located in defendant 
Thurman's apartment. 
Defendant's challenge to the search warrant is in part 
based on a claim that the factual basis recited in the 
affidavit is stale. Most all of the cases addressing the 
question of staleness approach it from the perspective of 
whether there is a sufficient showing that the evidence can 
still be located at the site to be searched. See, State v. 
Hansen, supra; State v. Stromberq, supra; State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). In this case, however, the 
challenge of staleness is not directed at the fruits of the 
search but instead at the underlying justification for the 
search. Merely because much of the information recited in the 
supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before 
is of no great significance. Such facts were for the purpose 
of showing that defendant had motive and opportunity to commit 
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place 
to search. The alleged stale allegations were not for the 
purpose of suggesting that evidence of the crime could still be 
located at the apartment. 
As noted, the allegedly stale facts were acted upon by law 
enforcement within days after the facts came to their 
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attention. Moreover, law enforcement acted with some dispatch 
after the May 15 bombing to effect the search. The warrant was 
issued one day after the incident and executed within 15 
minutes of the earliest time authorized by the warrant itself. 
The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested the likelihood 
that relevant evidence would still be in the apartment. 
(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 14, 16). As a 
consequence, the alleged staleness of information does not 
suggest the search would be fruitless and does not thereby 
undermine the probable cause upon which the warrant was based. 
The propriety of the search warrant, however, does not 
offer absolute sanctuary for the manner in which it was 
executed. The evidence establishes that the warrant was 
executed as if it was a "no-knock" warrant even though 
Magistrate Boyce did not authorize such a warrant. As a 
practical matter, the officers made a mere perfunctory knock 
and seconds later made a forced entry. It was only upon entry 
that the officers announced their identity and purpose. There 
was not only insufficient compliance with Section 77-23-10(1), 
Utah Code Ann., requiring notice of authority and purpose, 
there was not even an attempt by the officers to announce their 
identity and purpose before forcing entry. 
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It appears that the officers took it upon themselves to 
execute the lawful warrant in an unlawful manner. While the 
officers may well have had concern for their own safety, 
Magistrate Boyce considered such concerns expressed in the 
affidavit of Agent Conner but rejected them by not authorizing 
the requested "no-knock" warrant. (Affidavit of Agent Conner, 
paras. 17 and 18). 
Having determined that the search warrant was lawful but 
the manner of its execution unlawful, it is necessary for this 
court to determine the consequences of the latter. If the 
search of the apartment pursuant to the warrant had produced 
relevant evidence, one decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
would justify suppression of the evidence. State v. Rowe, 806 
P. 2d 730 (Utah App. 1991). In this particular case, however, 
the search of the apartment was fruitless. Relevant evidence 
was acquired only from a search of the storage area for which 
there was a purported consent but no warrant. This court then 
must analyze the consequences of the unlawful execution of a 
lawful search warrant in the context of the consents to search 
the storage area rather than in the context of the lawful 
issuance of the warrant itself. 
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III. CONSENTS TO SEARCH 
Because the evidence sought to be suppressed did not result 
from the search authorized by the warrant, the State has the 
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
consents to search which yielded the subject evidence were 
knowingly and voluntarily granted. In determining whether the 
State has met its burden, the court must consider generally the 
totality of the circumstances and specifically certain factors 
specified by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
There can be little doubt that from the perspective of the 
defendant, chaos reigned for about an hour following the forced 
entry by six officers with guns drawn. Within 45 minutes, 
however, things began to calm. By 7:00 or 7:15 a.m., almost an 
hour had passed since the forced entry and defendant had been 
treated by paramedics, was clothed and had called his 
employer. What is most persuasive, however, is the testimony 
of both defendant and Agent Swehla. Just ten minutes before 
defendant first consented to a search of the storage unit, 
Agent Swehla read an identical consent form verbatim to 
defendant. The consent form is itself clear and unequivocal 
and the court has found from the totality of the circumstances 
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that defendant understood the consent. Defendant himself 
testified he was not coerced. The court concludes that the 
State has met its burden of proving that the first consent to 
search the storage unit was knowingly and voluntarily granted. 
In drawing this conclusion, the court considered the 
totality of the circumstances, including the specific factors 
referenced in State v. Whittenback, the activities of the hour 
preceding the consent and such factors as a continuously 
shackled defendant. Additionally, the statement of an officer 
not directly involved in acquiring the consent suggesting that 
a search was inevitable did not vitiate the voluntariness of 
the consent. This statement is but a piece of evidence to be 
considered in the totality. Furthermore, given this court's 
review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, the statement was 
true. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274, n.7 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The same factors and evidence apply to the second consent 
to search the storage unit which was granted at 11:29 a.m. At 
the time of the second consent, however, the chaos of the 
initial entry was over six hours distant, defendant had been 
informed of his Miranda rights a second time and Agent Conner 
reviewed anew each item on the consent form. The court 
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therefore concludes from a totality of the circumstances that 
the State has met its burden of proof that the second consent 
to search the storage unit was knowingly and voluntarily 
granted. The court makes this conclusion after fully 
considering that the defendant was essentially shackled for six 
hours at the time he signed the second consent form for the 
storage unit. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), requires this court to also consider 
whether either consent was obtained by exploitation of the 
initial unlawful entry. The same evidence which persuaded this 
court that each consent was knowingly and voluntarily granted 
equally but independently persuades this court that the 
officers did not exploit the initial unlawful entry. The 
circumstances and passage of time from the entry to the first 
consent and the entry to the second consent purged each of the 
consents from the taint of the unauthorized "no-knock" entry. 
The officers did nothing to harken back to the entry and did 
not make any further unnecessary show of force not otherwise 
implicit by their presence. Focusing solely on the second 
consent to search the storage unit, the passage of time proved 
to be the best antiseptic, cleansing the second consent of any 
tadnt from the unlawful "no-knock" entry. 
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IV. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND PROLONGED DETENTION 
Defendant claims that he should have been given his Miranda 
warnings anew just prior to Agent Swehla's questioning which 
began about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. Defendant was told of his 
rights two times, the last occurring about four hours before 
the questioning but over two hours after the initial entry. 
These warnings remained sufficiently prominent to defendant 
that he interrupted the questioning and invoked his right to 
counsel. Furthermore, the same evidence supporting the 
voluntariness of the second consent to search the storage area 
similarly establishes that defendant's statements were not the 
product of the initial, unlawful entry. The court thus 
concludes that the State has met its burden in establishing 
that defendant's statements were knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Defendant's final claim is that defendant's prolonged 
detention constituted an arrest without probable cause. This 
court has found that defendant was seized in the sense that 
from and after 6:14 a.m. he was not free to leave. 
Correspondingly, the court's determination that the search 
warrant was premised on facts establishing a fair probability 
that evidence of the crime would be found necessarily means 
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that the officers had an articulable suspicion that defendant 
was responsible for the bombing. The officers were thus 
justified in detaining defendant until all searches were 
complete. Defendant's pre-arrest detention, then, while 
lengthy, was justified. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Suppress 
is denied. 
Dated this 4 ^ d a y of October, 1991. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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SPECIAL AGENT, RODERIC J. CONNER. 
I, Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent with the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), having been duly sworn, 
depose and say: 
1. I have been a Special Agent with ATF since September 24, 
1989. That as a result of my employment with ATF I have 
successfully completed the required training courses at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. That during 
my employment I am familiar with the Federal Firearms and Explosive 
laws and have conducted prior investigations concluding in the 
conviction of defendants. That prior to my employment with ATF I 
was a police officer with the West Linn, Oregon, Police Department 
for six and one half years. 
2. That on May 14, 1991, at about 8:20 a.m. Debbi Hale, a 
receptionist at Metz Bakery, while at work received a "bomb threat" 
telephone call in which the male caller said to "evacuate 
immediately, there's a bomb in the back of one of the trucks, this 
isn't a joke" and then hung up the phone. Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputies assisted the Metz Bakery management by checking 
the Metz premises. A bomb or explosive device was not discovered. 
3. That on May 15, 1991, at approximately 9:35 p.m. a pipe 
bomb exploded inside a 1985 Toyota Landcruiser owned by Howard 
Cook. The vehicle was parked in front of the Richard Craig 
residence, 5740 South 665 West, Murray, Utah. At the time of the 
explosion the vehicle was occupied by the eleven year old son of 
Howard Cook, Adam Cook. Adam Cook sustained serious injuries to 
his head, in fact, a AA size battery was lodged behind Adam's eye 
requiring emergency surgery to save his life* 
4. That on May 16, 1991, Detective Jeff Anderson (Murray, 
Utah, Police Department) and I interviewed Howard Cook at the 
University of Utah Hospital Emergency Room regarding the bombing. 
Mr. Cook was asked about his day's activities and told his us his 
schedule for May 15, 1991. Mr. Cook said that he went to work at 
Metz Bakery at approximately 6:00 a.m. He was at work until 4:00 
p.m. He believed that his car was locked and parked in the Metz 
Bakery parking lot the entire day. After work, Mr. Cook said that 
he went to his residence and worked in his yard until approximately 
5:50 p.m. At that time, Mr. Cook said that he went to his ex-
wife's home (approx. 2700 East 4300 South) to pick up his two sons, 
Geoffery and Adam, to spend the evening with him. After leaving 
his ex-wife's home they went to Wendy's Hamburgers (approx. 5900 
South State) and ordered their meal through the drive-up window. 
Mr. Cook said that he then took Adam to Boy Scouts at Viewmont 
Elementary School (approx 5700 South 720 West). Mr. Cook was asked 
by the Scout Master to go down by the Jordan River to see if there 
was another boy scout from the Troop that might have received wrong 
information about the meeting. Mr. Cook and his son, Geoffery, 
went down to the river but were unable to locate the other scout. 
They then went to the Richard Craig residence (5740 South 665 West) 
at approximately 7:30 p.m. as was his normal activity on Wednesday 
nights while waiting for Adam to return from his Boy Scout meeting. 
Mr. Cook said that he left the Landcruiser unlocked in from: of 
the Craig residence and took the keys inside with him. Mr. Cook 
said that he remained at the Craig's until Adam returned from Boy 
Scouts. When Adam arrived at the Craig's, Mr. Cook and Geoffery 
began to prepare to leave. While they were in the house Adam ran 
out to the Landcruiser to wait for them. Mr. Cook was at the front 
door when he saw Adam get in the front driver's side of the 
vehicle. Mr. Cook said that he saw the driver's side door open, 
a few seconds later he heard the horn and a "split second" later 
the bomb exploded. 
5. Mr. Cook described the explosion by saying that he saw -
a bright white light and heard a "huge" explosion. He looked 
outside and saw Adam hunched over the front seat of the vehicle. 
6. Mr. Cook was asked if_there_was anyonejwho_jwould„want^to 
do him harm. Mr. Cook said that he had" been having an affair with 
Wendy Thurman who worked with him at Metz' Bakery. Mr. Cook said 
that he had continued his relationship with Wendy after she got a 
divorce and had even spent the night of May 13, 1991, at Wendy's 
residence. Mr. Cook said that Wendy's ex-husband, Steve Thurman, 
knew of their affair; however, the affair was not the cause of the 
divorce. 
1. Mr. Cook said that Steve Thurman drives an early 1980fs 
Chevrolet Monza, cream or beige in color, with a square back. Jeff 
Anderson conducted a search of the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration 
record for Steve Thurman and found that he had registered a 1975 
Chevrolet Monza with license plate # THURM. 
8. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Marian 
Cook, Howard Cook's ex-wife. Ms. Cook said that the affair between 
Howard and Wendy was a contributing factor to their divorce in 
January. Ms. Cook said that she bacUbeen-called by Steve Thurman. 
She said that Thurman had told her that Howard and Wendy were 
having an affair and he wanted to know if Marian was going to kick 
Howard out of the house. 
9. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Wendy 
Thurman. She said that Steve would not talk to her after the 
divorce andLJjLa^not_made any threats against her. Wendy said that 
she and Howard came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a date 
several months ago and saw Steve Thurman in his car parked near the 
apartment watching them. Wendy said that Steve's father had 
committed suicide several years ago and his mother had terminal 
cancer. Wendy also said that Steve had been laid off from his job 
at Hercules a few months ago and he was having problems finding a 
job. 
10. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Linda 
Mae Bird, the Aunt of_Wendy Thunnan, who said that she had received 
a telephone call from SJ^ye__Thunnan about six months_ago and he 
told her he had hired a private investigator to watch Howard and 
Wendy. Mrs. Bird said that Steve was ^ extremely angry at Wendy 
because of the divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it. Mrs. 
Bird said that Steve knew where Howard parked his Landcruiser when 
he was visiting Wendy_at _her residence and he had photos of them 
together. 
11. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I contacted the 
managers office at the Tanglewood Apartments and determined that 
Steve Thurman was renting their apartment at 3843 West 3500 South, 
Apartment "H,f, and he had been the sole occupant of that apartment 
since last year. 
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of Murray, Utah Police 
who told me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is a neighbor 
of the Craig's. She said that she saw a small 2 door vehicle 
leaving the area Eastbound at a high rate of speed with its lights 
out. 
13. On May 16, 1991, Jerry Taylor, ATF Explosives Enforcement 
Officer examined the remains of the device recovered from in and 
around the Toyota Landcruiser and determined that the device 
consisted of batteries, remote control receiver, a servo-mechanism 
that was modified to serve as a switch, a cardboard box which 
concealed a pipe bomb that was wrapped with nails. 
14. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have 
found that individuals that manufacture and or position improvised 
bombs have these components and materials to construct improvised 
bombs in their residence, vehicles, workshops, or garage. The 
materials include: receipts for bomb components, actual components 
such as batteries, explosives, pipe bomb parts, tape, books, video 
tapes or manuals describing the assembly of improvised bombs, tools 
used to manufacture improvised bombs, and items described in 
paragraph 13 of this affidavit. 
15. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have 
reason to believe that Steve Thurman has and is currently violating 
firearms laws, to wit: 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) POSSESSION OF 
UNREGISTERED DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, and these offenses have been and 
are being committed on the property and dwelling specifically 
described as 3843 Rockwood Way #H, West Valley City/ Utah, and 
within the Central Division of the District of Utah, and in a 
vehicle registered to Steve Thurman which is described as a 1975 
Chevrolet Honza, Utah license #THURM. 
16. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training, 
I have reason to believe that on the property described in 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit there will be found property 
that constitutes evidence or commission of a crime; fruits of crime 
or things otherwise criminally possessed; property designed or 
intended for use or which is or has been used as a means of 
committing a criminal offense, to wit: items mentioned in 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit. 
17. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training, 
those individuals required to execute a warrant involving the 
search of explosives and their precursor materials will be in 
danger if Agents and Officers are required to announce their 
authority and purpose before executing this warrant as required by 
18 U.S.C. § 3109. Authority is therefore sought from this Court 
to break open any outer or inner doors or windows without giving 
notice of authority on the properties described in paragraph 15 of 
this affidavit in order to execute this search warrant. 
18. Finally, based upon my experience, knowledge, and 
training, the materials are hazardous to_public^safety, a threat 
to residents in the adjoining area, and the possibility that the 
suspect has animosity towards other victims possibly designated as 
targets of additional bombings. Authority is therefore sought from 
this Court to execute this warrant at any time in the day or night. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent 
BATF 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS day of May, 1991. 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
United States Magistrate Judge 
APPROVED: 
MARK K. VINCENT, Special 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
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rPMTPAf. DTVTSTON DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Search of 
(Nam«„ addfMt or tynmi d*»cnotion of person or pfooerty to o« s««rcr>«3J 
The property of 3843 West 3500 South #H 
West Val.lev City, Utah. and 
The propertv of a 1975 Chevrolet Monza CASE NUMBER: 
with Utah license plate #Thurm. 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO: Rndp.ric J, Conner . and any Authorized Officer of the United States 
Affidavit(s) having been made before me by g A R o p d c r ^ c J . C o n n e r who has reason to 
believe that Q on the person of or Q on the premises known as (name, description ana/or location) 
3843 West 3500 South #H 
West Valley Citv, Utah 
and 
1975 Chevrolet Monza with Utah license #THURM. 
in the. CENTRAL DIVISION District of U T A H .there is now 
concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the oerson
 Cr orooeny) 
See Attachment "A", which is attached hereto and incorporated herein bv ret 
I am satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any recorded testimony establish probable cause to believe that the persor 
or property so described is now concealed on the person or premises above-described and establish grounds for 
/ t h e issuance of this warrant. 
/? 
' YOU ARE HEHE3Y COMMANDED to search on or before. Mav 2 3 , 1 9 9 1 
Date 
US JuOQeor Magistrate 
/ (not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the person or property specified, serving this warrant 
\ and making the search x x ^ ^ X S X ? ^ (at any time in the day or night as I find 
reasonaole cause has been established) and if the person or property be found there to seize same, leaving a copy 
of this warrant and receipt for the person or property taken, and prepare a written inventory of the person or proo 
A erty seized and promptly return this warrant to RONALD N. BOYCE 
as required by law. 
• V d '/• i if* 
"M^
 v—w; 4-Q-QI — 
02t$ ana lmre isStfecJ ~ Citv ana Stale 
at S a l t Iteke C i t v . Utah 
R n n a l d N R o v r e , TJ<=? M a g i s t r a t e J u d g e " ^ ^ 
Carrie and Title of Judicial Offir.pr S^Tr 
r-dypoUjLfi 
Signature ot Judical Officer 
ATTACHMENT A 
Explosive materials, that is, gunpowder, model rocket igniters or 
motors, and commercial packaging for the explosive materials. Receipts 
or other documents related to the purchase of the explosive materials; 
tools, pipe nipples, pipe end caps, electrical wiring and connectors, 
packaging or duct tape and sundry items used in the fabrication of a 
destructive device. Bomb components to include batteries, switches, 
remote control receiver and transmitter, servo mechanism, nails, 
cardboard box and receipts for these items. Drawings, books, manuals, 
video tapes, diagrams or other forms of instructions relating to the 
fabrication of destructive devices. Photographs of destructive devices, 
their components, and the process involved in the manufacture of bombs. 
Equipment to be used for the manufacturing of components for destructive 
devices. Partially assembled or assembled destructive devices. Any 
documentation or information pertaining to the storage, possession, 
and/or manufacturing of destructive devices. 
